Muslims in Indian cities:Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto by Susewind, Raphael
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/0308518X17696071
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Susewind, R. (2017). Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto. Environment and
Planning A, 49(6), 1286-1307. DOI: 10.1177/0308518X17696071
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
Article
Muslims in Indian cities:
Degrees of segregation
and the elusive ghetto
Raphael Susewind
King’s College London, UK
Abstract
In India, the country with the third largest Muslim population in the world, residential segregation
along religious lines has long been of concern. Many go so far as to speak of the large-scale
‘ghettoization’ of Muslims, a trend commonly attributed to the state’s negligence towards this
religious minority and prolonged histories of so-called ‘communal’ violence between religious
groups. Others emphasize long-standing pattern of residential clustering in enclaves and claim that
these have always been voluntary. Both the ghetto and the enclave are usually considered highly
segregated spaces, though. This paper complicates such views through an in-depth engagement
with the seminal ethnographic volume Muslims in Indian Cities, edited by Laurent Gayer and
Christophe Jaffrelot. Based on novel quantitative estimates of religious demography, I contrast
and compare the same 11 cities studied in their book – Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Lucknow,
Aligarh, Bhopal, Hyderabad, Delhi, Cuttack, Kozhikode and Bangalore – using statistical indices of
segregation. This comparison with the ethnographic ‘gold standard’ shows that the mere extent of
segregation is an insufficient shortcut to the phenomenon of ghettoization: a ghetto actually need
not be highly segregated and a ‘mixed area’ can be surprisingly homogenous. Consequently, I
argue that one should not only distinguish between voluntary and forced clustering but also
consider the wider ‘mental maps’ through which inhabitants experience, perceive and judge
their city. Such mental maps specifically help to uncover historical trajectories, feelings of
insecurity and the future expectations of people regarding their cities – irrespective of
quantitative degrees of segregation.
Keywords
Segregation, Ghetto, Muslims, India, mixed methods
Introduction
Segregation of Muslims has once more become a concern both in Europe and North
America and, perhaps for diﬀerent reasons, in India and other countries of the global
South. For the global North, Lens (2017) notes in his comprehensive review essay that
essentially two distinct camps drive the debate, with those who fear the increased
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‘ghettoization’ and forced marginalization of Muslims on one side and those emphasizing
‘geographies of opportunity’ in ‘enclaves’ that reﬂect voluntary self-segregation on the other.
Both groups of researchers rely on the same quantitative measures of segregation, but they
draw rather diﬀerent qualitative inferences from them: the ghetto is seen as highly segregated
by force, the enclave as highly segregated by choice. Scholars working with qualitative data
tend to maintain a more complex middle ground; however, they still diﬀer widely in their
conclusions and policy recommendations.
In the global South, in contrast, both religious segregation and concern over its causes
and implications follow diﬀerent trajectories. In India, for instance, the country with the
third largest Muslim population in the world, clustered living in neighbourhoods deﬁned by
community, occupation and endogeneity has a long history (Heitzman 2008) – as do the
‘slum’ and the ‘citadel’ (more on which in the next section). But here, too, the publishing
of the so-called ‘Sachar report’, a ground-breaking government document that took stock
of the extent of socio-economic marginalization of Muslims (Sachar et al., 2006; cf.
Basant and Shariﬀ, 2010), sparked a fresh debate on these matters. One sentence in
particular stuck, as the report’s authors explicitly voiced their concern that ‘fearing for
their security, Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country’
(Sachar et al., 2006: 14).
Unlike other forms of residential clustering, segregation of Muslims in urban India is
thus increasingly perceived to be problematic, and commonly attributed to the state’s
negligence towards this religious minority, prolonged histories of so-called ‘communal’
violence between religious groups, and resulting prejudices and security concerns (Gayer
and Jaﬀrelot, 2012c; Thorat et al., 2015). The prime examples of this view are the
segregated and dilapidated neighbourhoods of Juhapura in Ahmedabad (Jaﬀrelot
and Thomas, 2012; Jasani, 2008) and Shivaji Nagar in Mumbai (Contractor, 2012;
Mhaskar, 2013), where ghettoization indeed seems to increase following each new
communal riot. Other studies contest this narrative by pointing out more benign factors
that may facilitate, or at least sustain, the residential segregation of Muslim Indians, such
as the pull eﬀects of economic clustering (Jaﬀrelot and Thomas, 2012; Jamil, 2014;
Susewind, 2015a), the transnational embeddedness of locally isolated neighbourhoods
(Verstappen and Rutten, 2015) or the role of ‘ghetto mentality’ and non-spatial
dimensions of isolation (Gupta, 2015). On balance, though, a pessimistic perspective
prevails: among both scholars and the public, the intertwined notions that (a) Muslims
are becoming strongly and increasingly segregated in urban India and that (b) this
indicates a problem are overwhelmingly commonsense, captured in proliferating talk of
‘Muslim ghettos’.
This study makes two contributions to these debates: an empirical one, which focuses on
India, and a conceptual and methodological one, which appears more widely applicable.
Empirically, I engage with the seminal volume Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of
Marginalisation (Gayer and Jaﬀrelot, 2012c) in a double comparative exercise. This
volume assembles detailed ethnographic case studies on the contemporary socio-spatial
position of Muslims in the Indian cities Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Aligarh,
Bhopal, Hyderabad, Delhi, Cuttack, Kozhikode and Bangalore. Through a systematic
review of these eleven cases, Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012a) distinguish three ideal-typical
‘trajectories of marginalization’, which, in their view, result in non-linear ways in three
ideal-typical ‘patterns of segregation’. They, too, are concerned that Indian Muslims
might be subject to increasing ghettoization – not at the same pace everywhere and in a
conceptually more rigorous sense than much popular discourse has it, but still to a worrying
extent.
Susewind 1287
My paper complements and complicates this view by focussing on one particular aspect of
ghettoization, namely the degree of spatial segregation. On the basis of quantitative indices, I
rank the same 11 cities discussed in their book from least to most segregated, comparing
them both with each other and also with the characterizations of Gayer and Jaﬀrelot
(2012c), taken as a kind of ethnographic ‘gold standard’. Due to the traditional scarcity
of oﬃcial statistics on religious demography in South Asia, this endeavour required
alternative estimates, which I derived from the social connotations of voters’ names on
electoral rolls – a pioneering work that resulted in unprecedented detailed maps of the
residential distribution of Muslims (raw data is available as part of Susewind, 2016).
Ultimately, this double comparison shows that the mere extent of segregation is an
insuﬃcient shortcut to the phenomenon of ghettoization – which is also the more widely
relevant implication of the paper. Speciﬁcally, I show that cities in which Muslims (and
through them ethnographers) experience ‘ghettoization’ can have very strong
(Ahmedabad) but also rather average (Mumbai and Aligarh) levels of segregation.
Similarly, one can ﬁnd ‘mixed areas’ of ‘resilient cosmopolitanism’ in cities that are barely
(Kozhikode), somewhat (Cuttack) and relatively strongly (Bangalore) segregated.
Apparently, the actual extent of ‘mixing’ between diﬀerent groups does not conclusively
determine whether an area is considered ‘mixed’, and it takes more than just segregation
to form a ghetto. More precisely, it takes something else.
Ghettos, enclaves, slums and citadels
What should be termed a ‘ghetto’ then, what an ‘enclave’, and how do both diﬀer from
‘slums’, ‘citadels’ and other forms of residential clustering? These questions have long been
of concern to urban sociologists and geographers, though usually with an empirical focus on
large cities in the global North (a complication addressed in the next section). The consensus
seems to be that all four formations are highly segregated spaces, but that it makes a
normative and hence conceptual diﬀerence whether their segregation came about and is
sustained by force or by choice: the former suggests a ‘ghetto’ or a ‘slum’, the latter an
‘enclave’ or a ‘citadel’ (e.g. Varady, 2005). What is more, the terms ‘ghetto’ and ‘enclave’ are
commonly used if spaces are primarily segregated along ethnic, racial, communal or caste
lines – i.e. according to ascribed identities of their residents – while the ‘slum’ and the
‘citadel’ denote primarily economic or class-based segregation (e.g. Galonnier, 2014;
Marcuse, 1997). In short: if an ethnic group is relegated to certain neighbourhoods we
speak of a ‘ghetto’; if poor people are forced to club together we see a ‘slum’; if an ethnic
group voluntarily chooses to segregate, they form an ‘enclave’; and if rich people isolate
themselves, this constitutes a ‘citadel’.
Empirically, each of these types of residential clustering might of course blend into
another, not least because of the intersection of ascribed and acquired identities and,
perhaps even more importantly, because of the inevitable variety of individual motives
and life trajectories. Over time, what started as a ‘ghetto’ through forced relegation might
attract new residents towards it who see it much more as an ‘enclave’ and vice versa.
However, from a conceptual perspective, I agree with most of the literature that both
formations should be treated as very diﬀerent ideal types (Peach, 2005; cf. Galonnier,
2015: 94–96). This has methodological implications in that it does not suﬃce to merely
identify the extent of an area’s isolation to categorize it, as Wacquant (2015: 1078) wrote:
the proper object of inquiry [for research on urban marginality] is not the place itself and its
residents but the multilevel structural processes whereby persons are selected, thrust and
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maintained in marginal locations, as well as the social webs and cultural forms they subsequently
develop therein.
Only such attention to both wider processes and subjective meaning enables us to
disentangle the ‘ghetto’ from the ‘enclave’, or indeed the ‘slum’ from the ‘citadel’. Only
the ﬁrst denotes forced segregation according to ascribed identity, or, in Wacquant’s
seminal deﬁnition, ‘a bounded, ethnically uniform sociospatial formation born of the
forcible relegation of a negatively typed population’ (Wacquant, 2008: 8, my emphases).
Other than its commonplace use in Indian as much as global popular discourse suggests,
the ‘ghetto’ thus ought to refer to a fairly speciﬁc thing.
All four conceptual takes on residential clustering share, however, the notion of strong
isolation or segregation – a precondition that is rarely made explicit. This raises important
questions: just how segregated should a place be to qualify as a ‘ghetto’? Is a ‘ghetto’ more or
less segregated than an ‘enclave’? While I appreciate the attempt to distinguish voluntary
from forced segregation (and the related attempt to highlight the many entanglements in
between these two poles), my paper sets out to complicate precisely this baseline condition of
‘strong’ segregation that so often gets unquestioned (for a rare exception, see Vaughan and
Arbaci, 2011).
Muslims in Indian cities
In India, urban segregation research is a relatively new phenomenon, largely because good
quantitative data is still hard to come by, because of the traditional emphasis on village
studies (Nandy, 2007) and on colonial rather than contemporary urbanism (e.g. Ballhatchet
and Harrison, 1980; Gooptu, 2001). Prakash (2002) refers to the ‘urban turn’ in South Asian
studies and Shatkin (2013: 1) speaks of India’s ‘remarkable urban moment’. The emerging
body of literature on Indian cities that they have in mind still largely focuses on the
metropolises of Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad and Calcutta, though,
neglecting other regional centres and smaller towns (Donner and de Neve, 2006). Due to
the manner in which Census data in particular is presented, most studies on urban residential
patterns also focus on caste rather than religion (e.g. Bhan and Jana, 2015; Sidhwani, 2015).
Consequently, the publication ofMuslims in Indian Citiesmarks a milestone in terms of both
its breadth (the book covers more localities than any previous work, including a few
uncommon choices) and depth (each city chapter is grounded in thorough, often
doctoral–dissertation–length ethnographic ﬁeldwork).
On a conceptual level, the volume also introduces fresh rigor, expanding on Wacquant’s
seminal work on forced relegation (Wacquant, 2008). One could long debate whether it is
appropriate to use concepts derived from experiences in the global North to cities in the
global South (and Galonnier, 2015 sums this up nicely by emphasizing that the heuristic
qualities of ideal types could be harnessed even if substantial arguments need re-evaluation).
For this paper, I take an easy way out of these questions by following whatever Muslims in
Indian Cities decided to do, because that is the book that I aim to re-study. In their
introduction, Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012b: 22) suggest the following criteria for ‘Muslim
ghettos’ (emphasis in original):
Building upon this basic deﬁnition [by Wacquant, 2008], the concept of ‘ghetto’ can be further
elaborated by pointing out ﬁve major characteristics of these spaces of relegation: [1] an element
of social and/or political constraint over the residential options of a given population; [2] the
class and caste diversity of these localities, which regroup individuals of diﬀerent social
Susewind 1289
backgrounds on the basis of ethnic or religious ascribed identities; [3] the neglect of these
localities by state authorities, translating into a lack of infrastructures, educational facilities,
etc.; [4] the estrangement of the locality and its residents from the rest of the city, due to lack of
public transportation as well as limited job opportunities and restricted access to public spaces
beyond the locality; [5] the subjective sense of closure of residents, related to objective patterns of
estrangement from the rest of the city.
Importantly, only two of the ﬁve components of this deﬁnition reﬂect spatial segregation per
se – constraint over residential choices and estrangement from the rest of the city – while the
other three point to the social mechanisms through which mere segregation is turned into
and experienced as ghettoization. This mirrors the conceptual debate elsewhere, as we have
seen in the last section. But Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012a) themselves then continue to use this
careful deﬁnition of the ghetto as both process and place to group their 11 case studies into
two typologies (summarized in the ﬁnal two columns of Table 1 below). On the one
hand, they diﬀerentiate among three ideal–typical trajectories of marginalization: ‘the ﬁrst
combines the post-Partition fall and identity politics, while the second is over-determined by
communal violence and political (sometimes cultural) obliteration and the third by some
Table 1. Muslim population shares, segregation indices, trajectories of marginalization and patterns of
segregation.
City
Muslim population share Segregation indices
Trajectory Pattern
Census
2001
Census
2011
Electors
2014 D D(M) D(W) D(S)
Jaipur(city)
0.18 0.19 0.29
0.29 0.19 0.21 0.29
n/a GhettoJaipur (built) 0.30 0.20 0.22 0.30
Kozhikode (city)
0.35 0.38
0.27 0.38 0.24
0.25 0.36 Resilient MixedKozhikode (built) 0.30 0.36 0.25
Lucknow (built)
0.26 0.26
0.24 0.41 0.29 0.29 0.41
Partition EnclaveLucknow (city) 0.23 0.42 0.30 0.31 0.42
Cuttack (built&city) 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.38 Resilient Mixed
Bhopal (built)
0.27 0.26 0.23
0.49 0.34 0.37 0.49
Partition n/aBhopal (city) 0.50 0.35 0.39 0.50
Mumbai (built)
0.19 0.21 0.17 0.51 0.38 0.38
0.50
Riots GhettoMumbai (city) 0.51
Aligarh (city) 0.41 0.43 0.32 0.59 0.40 0.43 0.57 Riots Enclave
Bangalore (built) 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.51 Resilient Mixed
Hyderabad (city) 0.43 0.30 0.32 0.60 0.42 0.42 0.59 Partition
Aligarh (built) 0.41 0.43 0.29 0.59 0.43 0.45 0.59 Riots Enclave
Bangalore (city) 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.57 0.46 0.46 0.57 Resilient Mixed
Delhi (built)
0.12 0.13
0.07 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.52
Partition EnclaveDelhi (city) 0.06 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.55
Hyderabad (built) 0.43 0.30 0.21 0.63 0.51 0.53 0.63 Partition Enclave
Ahmedabad (city)
0.14 0.14
0.12 0.71 0.57 0.56 0.71
Riots GhettoAhmedabad (built) 0.10 0.73 0.62 0.64 0.73
Note: In this table, each city appears twice: once delimited by its administrative boundary and once by the extent of its
densely built-up area. For each case, the table lists the Muslim population shares according to Census data for 2001 and
2011, estimated Muslim shares of the electorate in 2014, four segregation indices used in this study, and trajectories of
marginalization and patterns of segregation identified by Gayer and Jaffrelot (2012a).
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resilient cosmopolitanism’ (Gayer and Jaﬀrelot, 2012a: 320). On the other hand, they argue
that these diﬀerent trajectories result in three distinct patterns of segregation in non-linear
ways: ghettos, enclaves and mxied areas. A ghetto fulﬁls all ﬁve criteria quotes above, an
enclave only some of them (most notably appearing much more voluntary in nature), and a
mixed area is in a sense the conceptual contrast. In the remainder of this study, I complement
and contrast these qualitative typologies on a quantitative level.
Data and methodology
Religious demography is a sensitive matter in India, and disaggregated data often remains
classiﬁed. For instance, the Census of India only publishes Muslim population shares for
whole cities, not for smaller enumeration units. Therefore, for this study, I tapped into an
alternative source of data: the religious connotations of electors’ names on the voters lists
used in the last Indian general elections, held during the spring of 2014. The raw electoral
rolls of the 11 cities were downloaded from the websites of the chief electoral oﬃcers of the
respective states – Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh – throughout the summer of
2014, and they were further processed using a dedicated probabilistic algorithm (Susewind,
2015b). Regarding the separation of Muslim from non-Muslim names in North India, this
algorithm achieves positive and negative predictive values well over 95%. Moreover, the
algorithm’s accuracy further improved as individually wrong classiﬁcations tended to cancel
each other across the thousand or so names on an average electoral roll. Since this source is
available on the level of polling booths, whose geographical latitudes and longitudes are
known and whose coverage is often less than a quarter of a square kilometre in urban areas,
this method results in estimates of religious demography that are several hundred times more
detailed than Census data.
However, this data source can cause other potential problems. First, the electorate
excludes minors. Since recent Census ﬁgures suggest that religious demography varies
only marginally by age group, this should however not aﬀect the relative proportions of
Muslims and non-Muslims. Further, minors do not typically form separate households;
therefore, for a study on residential choices, knowing the demographic balance among
adults should suﬃce. Second, in India, one must be registered to exercise the right to
vote, much like in the US and other countries, and Muslims might be more or less
likely than non-Muslims to appear on the electoral rolls. However, this, too, seems
improbable for two reasons. On the one hand, the registration process is closely
observed by powerful parties with competing interests, making it unlikely that Muslims
are denied franchise in a systematic way, even though rumours to the contrary are
frequently voiced in political competition (as are, incidentally, rumours of preferential
treatment and ‘pampering’ of Muslims). On the other hand, a detailed analysis of the
electoral choices of Muslims in two major Indian states during the last general elections
found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in turnout compared to non-Muslims (Susewind and
Dhattiwala, 2014), which prima facie suggests similar levels of engagement with the
electoral process, and by extension similar registration rates, of both Muslims and non-
Muslims. In any case, distortions resulting from name-matching accuracy, age distribution,
denial of franchise or diﬀerential electoral registration rates would all need to aﬀect
diﬀerent areas of a city diﬀerently in order to aﬀect segregation indices. There is little
reason to believe this may happen, even in the cases of Jaipur, Kozhikode, Aligarh and
Delhi, for which Table 1 records signiﬁcant diﬀerences between aggregate name-matching
estimates and Census ﬁgures.
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Therefore, in summary, I consider the religious make-up of the electorate to be a relatively
comprehensive and suﬃciently accurate proxy for the wider population distribution – at
least as long as disaggregated oﬃcial data remain unavailable. This assessment was
corroborated by the authors of the eleven substantial chapters of Muslims in Indian Cities,
who generously reviewed draft maps for this article in light of their detailed ethnographic
knowledge and generally found them highly plausible.
This left two major design decisions: how to delimit urban boundaries and how to
measure the extent of segregation. According to the typical pattern of an old Muslim
town that is surrounded by more recent and largely non-Muslim suburbs, segregation
would appear more or less acute depending on how widely one draws the circle around
an Indian city. The most obvious choice would be to use the formally designated
administrative city area as the boundary line. However, due to rapid urban growth and
political gerrymandering, such administrative boundaries may be quite outdated and often
bear little resemblance to lived experience. This problem is especially acute where Muslim
ghettos are deliberately relegated to remote and detached areas outside formal city limits.
Moreover, the extent to which administrative boundaries mirror ground realities varies
widely from city to city; this further complicates comparisons. Therefore, I complement
administrative city limits with a second boundary line, which is derived from the
‘objective’ urban extent of a ‘densely built-up area’ as seen from space (Schneider et al.,
2003). Although the satellite data used to derive this boundary line is already more than 15
years old, it measures urban extent at approximately the same time as the 2001 Census,
whose data and administrative units were used as reference in Muslims in Indian Cities.
Lastly, geographers have long debated the question how best to quantify the extent of
spatial segregation and come up with numerous suggestions; a recent review counts no less
than 43 distinct approaches (Apparicio et al., 2014). In this study, I employ one of the oldest
and most widely used measures: D, the index of dissimilarity proposed by Duncan and
Duncan (1955a, 1955b). D ranges from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation) and
measures the proportion of either of two population groups that would need to relocate in
order to achieve an even spatial distribution of both. For the purpose of this study, D has a
number of attractive properties. First, it was developed to compare the spatial distribution of
two groups (here, Muslims and non-Muslims). Second, it measures the extent of segregation
across whole cities rather than quantifying the degree of isolation for separate localities
within a given city. Third, it does not assume that proximity to the city centre is
necessarily desirable (an arguably US-centric assumption made by several other indices;
cf. Lens, 2017: 2). Finally, D operates on proportions and is insensitive to absolute
population shares, which facilitates comparisons across cities and renders results that are
more robust.
However, D ignores the spatial location of each unit of measurement. Suppose a city has
10 polling booths with a high percentage of Muslim electors. For the calculation of D, it will
not matter whether these are all clubbed together in one place or dotted across the city,
whether they form one larger segregated space or are mixed across various neighbourhoods.
To address this problem, Morrill (1991) suggested a modiﬁed index, D(M), which adjusts for
tract contiguity: if several polling booths with a high percentage of Muslim electors are near
each other, D(M) treats them as one contiguous area of Muslim concentration, which seems
more sensible for the purpose of this study than the original index. Besides D and D(M),
I calculated two more measures of segregation, D(W) and D(S), which were originally
proposed by Wong (1993). Both are variations of the same theme using slightly diﬀerent
methods of spatial adjustment, and they are merely reported to demonstrate that neither
would result in a fundamentally diﬀerent city ranking.
1292 Environment and Planning A 49(6)
Findings
Table 1 lists the four quantitative measures D, D(M), D(W) and D(S) for all the 11 cities
studied in Muslims in Indian Cities, sorted according to D(M) values from least segregated
(Jaipur) to most segregated (Ahmedabad). As previously discussed, each city is listed twice:
once delimited by its administrative boundary and once by the extent of its densely built-up
area. The corresponding maps of Muslim demography can be found throughout this article
(Figures 1–11). Prior to discussing the overall ranking and its implications regarding the
tenuous link between segregation and ghettoization, though, this section summarizes my
ﬁndings for each city separately.
Quite surprisingly, the table is topped by Jaipur, even though Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012a:
325) described its Muslim settlements as a ‘ghetto in the making’. However, with segregation
indices of D(M)¼ 0.19 within municipal boundaries and D(M)¼ 0.20 within the slightly
narrower area of dense population, Jaipur appears to be the least segregated city by a
robust margin. One solution to this riddle may lie in the assertion by Jai Singh Rathore
(2012: 103) that many Jaipuri Muslims set the mental ‘boundaries of their city [. . .] around
the walled city’, which indeed shows a more pronounced clustering of Muslim and non-
Muslim localities (see Figure 1). While this pattern remains a statistical exception within the
wider city, the fact that it so powerfully shapes people’s mental maps shows the true
challenge of delimiting the city in meaningful ways – a point to which I return in the
conclusion of this study. A second possible explanation is to take the diachronic aspect of
a ‘ghetto in the making’ (Gayer and Jaﬀrelot, 2012a: 325, my emphasis) more seriously: the
low quantitative measure of segregation in Jaipur reﬂects only one temporal snapshot; if
much lower segregation had been experienced in the past, a worsening trend might well be
experienced (and reported) as a process of ghettoization.
In contrast, the segregation indices for Kozhikode (Calicut) – the second-least segregated
city – conﬁrm the ethnographic picture: ‘in Kozhikode, Muslims are not relegated to the
peripheral areas but are rather choosing to extend into the city’s mixed localities’
(Kanchana, 2012: 285). Nonetheless, its segregation index of D(M)¼ 0.24 is a robust step
up from that of Jaipur, and the value rises to D(M)¼ 0.25 if one considers the wider built-up
area surrounding Kozhikode, which is signiﬁcantly larger than its administrative boundary
(see Figure 2).
In terms of segregation between Muslims and non-Muslims, Lucknow marks the upper
end of the lower third of the table, with D(M)¼ 0.29 for the built-up area and D(M)¼ 0.30
within the municipality itself (see Figure 3). However, in Muslims in Indian Cities, Lucknow
does constitute a special case, since Verniers (2012) chose to focus his case study on the
sectarian strife between Shia and Sunni Muslims rather than the relations between Muslims
and non-Muslims per se. Since sectarian demography cannot be reliably established using
name-matching technology, I cannot compare his chapter with my quantitative segregation
indices (however, see ﬁgure 5 in Susewind and Taylor, 2015 for an experimental attempt to
map sectarian demography in Lucknow).
The next three cities – Cuttack, Bhopal and Mumbai – form an interesting cluster in the
middle of the ranking. In his chapter on Cuttack, Kanungo (2012) asserts that most Muslims
there ‘continue to live with their Hindu neighbours in the traditional sahis/mohallas (mixed
neighbourhoods) rather than contemplating to move out to live in an exclusive Muslim
enclave’. Therefore, in Muslims in Indian Cities, the city is categorized as being resilient
cosmopolitan. In contrast, according to Jaﬀrelot and Wu¨lbers (2012), Bhopal is the
prototype of the post-partition ‘trajectory of marginalization’, a former princely capital
where native Muslims largely remain conﬁned to the old city. Their growing segregation
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is not the result of communal violence; rather, it is because socially mobile non-Muslims
leave while impoverished Muslims stay behind. Finally, Mumbai is a typical riot-prone city –
though here, too, Muslim ghettoization through violent exclusion cannot clearly be isolated
from economic deprivation (Contractor, 2012).
As diﬀerent as these three cities appear in terms of their trajectories of marginalization
and patterns of segregation, they share similar quantitative indices of Muslim
marginalization. Irrespective of boundary lines, only ﬁve percentage points separate
Cuttack, with D(M)¼ 0.33 (see Figure 4), from Mumbai, with D(M)¼ 0.38 (see Figure 6).
Bhopal occupies the middle place, with D(M)¼ 0.34 for its built-up area and D(M)¼ 0.35
for its municipality (see Figure 5). In the conclusion of this study, I return to this disjuncture
between qualitative characteristics and quantitative ranking.
Figure 1. Map of Muslim demography in Jaipur. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014, extent of
densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind (2016),
OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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Below this middle block, Table 1 becomes more cluttered since Aligarh, Bangalore and
Hyderabad all appear at diﬀerent positions in the ranking, depending on the chosen
boundary line. In the case of Aligarh, this probably reﬂects the double character of
segregation in the city: the much wider built-up area (see Figure 7) has long been
subjected to Hindu–Muslim riots; however, the city centre is also home to the Aligarh
Muslim University (AMU), which is the minority’s premier institution of higher education
in India and has huge symbolic importance. As Galonnier (2012) illustrates in her chapter,
the presence of AMU has led to the establishment of a number of Muslim upper class
citadels – a rather diﬀerent form of spatial segregation from both the riot-induced ghetto
and the traditional enclave, in which residents ‘made sense of their spatial concentration
both in terms of voluntary aggregation [vis-a-vis less advantaged Muslims] and compelled
segregation [vis-a-vis non-Muslims]’ (Galonnier, 2014: 107). Consequently, the Aligarh
Figure 2. Map of Muslim demography in Kozhikode. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014,
extent of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind
(2016), OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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municipality appears to have a little lower segregation, with D(M)¼ 0.40, than the wider
conglomerate, with D(M)¼ 0.43.
The city of Bangalore is next in rank. Although classiﬁed by Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012a)
as resilient cosmopolitan and considered to be a city with a ‘minority at ease’ (Mohammad-
Arif, 2012), it occupies approximately the upper end of the middle third of the segregation
ranking. With indices of D(M)¼ 0.41 for the suburban built-up area and D(M)¼ 0.46 for
the smaller area comprising the actual city (see Figure 8), Bangalore, in fact, appears to be
approximately twice as segregated as Kozhikode and one and a half times as Cuttack, which
are the other two cities in the resilient cosmopolitan category.
Hyderabad, in turn, is the third split case. The municipality itself is roughly as segregated
as greater Bangalore or Aligarh city, with D(M)¼ 0.42. However, a considerably lower
number of Muslims (21% rather than 32% or even 40%, as reported by Rao and Thaha,
Figure 3. Map of Muslim demography in Lucknow. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014,
extent of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind
(2016), OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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2012) populate the much larger densely inhabited area around Hyderabad (visualized in
Figure 9). With an index of D(M)¼ 0.51, the region is also considerably more segregated,
surpassing greater Aligarh, Bangalore city and even Delhi.
With the national capital, we ﬁnally reach the upper end of the segregation ranking, and
Figure 10 shows most of Delhi as one blank space in terms of Muslim presence – a
particularly striking contrast to the adjacent state of Uttar Pradesh to the east and the
Mewat region to the south. Consequently, Delhi’s segregation indices are among the
strongest of all 11 cities: D(M)¼ 0.47 for the built-up area (which extends into
neighbouring states) and D(M)¼ 0.50 for Delhi itself. In other words, in order to achieve
a religiously even spatial pattern in Delhi, either half of the capital’s Muslim or half of its
non-Muslim citizens would need to relocate to another neighbourhood. However, despite
Figure 4. Map of Muslim demography in Cuttack. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014, extent
of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind (2016),
OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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this stark segregation, it is worth keeping in mind the speciﬁc situation of a national capital;
as Gayer (2012: 236) concluded, ‘the dynamics of ‘‘enclavement’’ in this locality [. . .] have as
much to do with class as they do with religion’.
Finally and unsurprisingly, the ranking is topped by Ahmedabad, home to Juhapura,
whose standing as the prototypical Muslim ghetto of contemporary India was cemented
after the ‘2002 pogrom, when [Ahmedabad] became the most aﬀected Indian city in terms of
casualties of communal riots’ (Jaﬀrelot and Thomas, 2012: 45). With segregation indices of
D(M)¼ 0.57 for the area under municipal control and D(M)¼ 0.62 for the wider
conglomerate, most of Ahmedabad appears even more blank when it comes to Muslim
presence than Delhi (see Figure 11) and tops the quantitative ranking across all the four
indices listed in Table 1.
Figure 5. Map of Muslim demography in Bhopal. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014, extent
of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind (2016),
OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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Segregation and the ghetto
After considering each city separately, let us now discuss the ranking as such. The ﬁrst
interesting aspect is that the type of city delimitation – by administrative boundary or the
extent of the densely built-up area – does not appear to matter as much as expected.
Although it does have an impact on the estimated share of Muslim population, with the
exception of Hyderabad (and to an extent, Aligarh and Bangalore), the choice of boundary
does not fundamentally alter the ranking of cities from least to most segregated, even in cases
where both boundary lines diﬀer widely.
However, in my view, the most striking feature of Table 1 – seen as a whole – is not this
technical aspect but the much more fundamental disjuncture between my quantitative
ranking and the qualitative typology developed by Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012a). First,
Figure 6. Map of Muslim demography in Mumbai. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014, extent
of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind (2016),
OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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consider the trajectories of marginalization. Cities that are perceived as resilient
cosmopolitan by both inhabitants and ethnographic observers appear all over the
ranking, from second least (Kozhikode) to third most segregated (Bangalore, discounting
the split case of Hyderabad). Similarly, the cities where the marginalization of Muslims is
understood to be primarily an outcome of communal riots can be highly segregated
(Ahmedabad), but also sit comfortably in the middle of the ranking table (Mumbai and
Aligarh city).
Ironically, the disjuncture is even more apparent when it comes to patterns of segregation.
Mixed areas appear in cities having very diﬀerent quantitative segregation levels
(Kozhikode, Cuttack and Bangalore) – and so do enclaves (Lucknow, Aligarh, Delhi and
Hyderabad). Further, even cities where Muslims are perceived to live in ghettos according to
the comprehensive deﬁnition by Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012b) occupy the strongly segregated
Figure 7. Map of Muslim demography in Aligarh. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014, extent
of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind (2016),
OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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end (Ahmadabad), the middle region (Mumbai), and – if one considers the authors’
prediction – even the least segregated end of the ranking (Jaipur).
This ﬁnding is somewhat foreshadowed by the very fact that the deﬁnition of a ghetto
used by Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012b) has ﬁve components, only two of which deal with
segregation per se and are thus amenable to quantitative geography in the ﬁrst place.
Consequently, it does not suﬃce to establish statistical measures; one also needs to
consider the social mechanisms that result in and sustain diﬀerent levels of segregation (as
argued by Wacquant, 2015). From this perspective, the disjuncture may reinforce the
increasingly acknowledged conceptual diﬀerence between segregation by choice and that
by force, between the ghetto and the enclave, the slum and the citadel: although they
carry diﬀerent qualitative characteristics, both may be found in cities with rather similar
degrees of segregation (Peach, 2005). Similarly, the resilient cosmopolitanism of mixed areas
Figure 8. Map of Muslim demography in Bangalore. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014,
extent of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind
(2016), OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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may well depend on the extent to which Muslims partake in the religious festivals, economic
activities and everyday lives of non-Muslims and vice versa rather than on their strictly
residential choices (as argued by Gayer and Jaﬀrelot, 2012a).
However, the problem may go even deeper. In addition to being qualitatively diﬀerent
phenomena that appear quantitatively similar – as acknowledged in the literature – ghettos
and enclaves can be quantitatively very diﬀerent: they can designate not only high levels of
segregation but also low ones. Consequently, one should consider the mediation of social
geography through mental maps (Gould and White, 1986) beyond the diﬀerentiation of
ghetto and enclave and, therefore, beyond the dominant fault line in global debates on
segregation.
Figure 9. Map of Muslim demography in Hyderabad. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014,
extent of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind
(2016), OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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What does this mean? First, it may be necessary to return to the question of city
delimitation. It is clear that Table 1 shows that a city’s quantitative segregation level may
not depend much on the various objective city boundaries chosen. However, its
characterization as ghettoized, mixed and so on arguably reveals considerable diﬀerences
between either of these boundary lines and the mental maps of those who live in these cities.
For instance, Jaipur appears to be the least segregated city to the quantitative geographer;
however, it is described as being on the verge of ghettoization by its inhabitants and
ethnographic observers. Instead of suggesting that any of these observers is wrong, this
diﬀerence in understanding may well point to the fact that all three operate with rather
diﬀerent implicit or explicit boundaries. In fact, the case of Jaipur is the most obvious
example of how people’s views of a city diﬀer according to their mental maps, and
references to very speciﬁc mental maps can be found in the chapters on Kozhikode,
Figure 10. Map of Muslim demography in Delhi. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014, extent
of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind (2016),
OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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Lucknow, Bhopal, Bangalore and Hyderabad, as well. This may indicate a particularly
fruitful area for further mixed-method research: for instance, it would be interesting to see
whether quantitative and qualitative perspectives on segregation converge if both were to
explicate and align their implicit mental maps of the city.
Second, attending to mental maps is crucial because they can change more quickly than
the built reality and, therefore, in a sense reﬂect change over time as it happens. Real estate
ownership shifts slowly, especially when inheritance is concerned. Sometimes, sales are also
prohibited by laws designed to prevent further segregation, such as the Disturbed Area Act
in Gujarat, which leads to a situation where high levels of social mixing are enforced in
neighbourhoods whose residents nonetheless consider each other to be ‘next-door strangers’
(Dhattiwala, 2016). In particular, the example of Jaipur – least segregated in quantitative
terms, but described as a ghetto in the making by the ethnographer – highlights the
Figure 11. Map of Muslim demography in Ahmedabad. Estimated Muslim share of the electorate in 2014,
extent of densely built-up area (solid line) and administrative boundaries (dotted line). Source: Susewind
(2016), OpenStreetMap and ML Infomap.
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importance of historical trajectories: perhaps, the ghetto represents a trend rather than the
status quo, a spatial future that is expected, feared, or hoped for than the spatial present in
which one (perhaps uneasily) lives. Often, ethnography is needed to uncover both history
and (folk) historiography, and quantitative snapshots of the present do not suﬃce.
One ﬁnal step might be to reconsider whether experiences of ghettoization actually relate
to residential segregation at all instead of reﬂecting economic, political and personal
marginalization within a city. Gayer and Jaﬀrelot (2012b) acknowledge these factors in
their comprehensive deﬁnition of the term ghetto. However, I fear that their emphasis on
the political and social mechanisms that produce these spaces and the importance that their
deﬁnition attaches to a subjective ‘sense of closure’ is completely lost in the subsequent
policy debate and sadly also in much of the related academic literature. It takes more
than segregation to form a ghetto. Or rather: it takes something else.
Supplementary material
A replication dataset and additional disaggregated statistics on religion and politics in India are
available under open licences as part of Susewind (2016).
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